

December 5, 1977

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TO: Fellows of the Committee for the
Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal

The enclosed article will appear next month, just before the annual national meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington. Because nearly a thousand reprints have already been requested, and because the name of the Committee has been repeatedly invoked in the national news media, I expect to be asked --- and you may be asked -- if the type of attacks described in the article represent the thinking of the individual Committee members. Therefore, I felt that courtesy required that I show you the article in preprint.

The question is not whether you "believe in" psychic phenomena, nor even whether you believe the research is being done competently or is worth doing. The question is whether the sweeping attacks being made indiscriminately by a few individuals against a wide range of beliefs, life styles, and scientific research represents your thinking as to how these issues should be addressed.

Prof. Kurtz and Mr. Randi have managed to convince much of the media that they speak for "a growing number of scientists, philosophers, and other defenders of logic and the scientific method" (NY Times, Nov 20/77). The credibility of this claim rests heavily on the willingness of you and other respected Fellows of the Committee to have your names used in this way.

Some members of the Committee have told me they are disturbed that their names are being used to legitimate such actions, which they consider betray both the principles of the humanist movement and the essence of logic and the scientific method. A great many thoughtful letters to the editor of The Humanist have expressed similar concerns in forceful terms. The American Ethical Union has withdrawn its support of The Humanist. Yet the Chairman and a few others continue to claim they are speaking for you.

Dr. Truzzi has told you why he resigned on August 10 as Co-Chairman of the Committee and as Editor of The Zetetic, and later from the Committee itself, asking that his name not be used by the Committee. However, you may not realize that his name is still being cited as Co-Chairman and as Editor in November correspondence sent to the newspapers, several hundred TV stations, both houses

Approved For Release 2001/03/26 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080012-1

- 2 -

of Congress, and various agencies of the Federal Government. Your name also appears on these letters, which are causing considerable concern.

When I am asked whether the noted scholars and logicians on the Committee personally condone this approach to "scientific investigation of claims of the paranormal," I want to reply factually. That is why I have written you. It is not enough for one to say the authors and The Humanist do not officially speak for the Committee. As Dr. Truzzi learned, the constant use of the Committee's name in connection with these attacks has rendered such a response fatuous.

I assume that all humanists agree that claims of the paranormal should be scientifically investigated. But if you have any reservations at all as to how this is now being done in your name, I would appreciate hearing from you directly. A stamped self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.



Theodore Rockwell



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Irrational Rationalists: A Critique of *The Humanist's Crusade Against* Parapsychology

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ROCKWELL¹

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The Humanist, the voice of the American Humanist Association and, until recently, of the American Ethical Union, has published a number of articles devoted to "debunking" parapsychology in general and certain individuals in particular. It also set up and sponsors a Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICP). Although the magazine claims that its intent is to bring rationality to a discussion often characterized by emotion and misinformation, the writings have not lived up to that aim. We submitted a paper to *The Humanist* to point out and document the extent to which its articles have departed from this objective. Without discussing the merits of parapsychology, the paper charged that *The Humanist* has so outraged the rules of rational discourse in this area that it has compromised its claim to the rationalist platform.

The Humanist was willing to publish only excerpts from the introduction to the paper, but the Editor told the authors that "we have made a serious mistake—a marked departure from our stated aims" and that "we intend to proceed differently from now on." Yet, shortly thereafter, the Executive Committee of CSICP, under the leadership of the Editor of *The Humanist*, called a press conference whose content was fairly indicated by the following headline in the *New York Times* (August 10, 1977): "Panel Fears Vogue for the Paranormal. Scientists Say Belief in Astrology and Parapsychology May Bring a Society of 'Unreason.'"

The Editorial Board of *The Humanist* contains some philosophers and scientists of stature, and the magazine has had an impact from time to time in other fields. In view of this, the *Journal* considers it

¹ Our thanks to Dr. R. A. McConnell, who read an earlier draft of this paper and made many helpful suggestions for its improvement.

CPYRGHT

important to put on record a factual description of the nature of the battle being waged by *The Humanist*, so that parapsychologists, psychologists, historians, and sociologists may be fully aware of this particular facet of parapsychology's long struggle for scientific recognition. Therefore, the paper submitted to *The Humanist* has been revised for publication in the *Journal* and appears below.

INTRODUCTION

The Humanist has been emphasizing the urgent need for maintaining on the national scene an instrument of rationality. Yet, we believe that in some areas, notably parapsychology, it has traded away its rationalist birthright for a mess of rhetorical pottage. The purpose of this paper is to document the basis for this charge, and to call for a return to rationalist principles.

We shall confine our attention to *The Humanist*'s treatment of investigations into psi phenomena. Our charge is that the evaluations it has published have abused the principles of rational discourse as often and as badly as the worst of those they seek to discredit. We cite enough examples below to demonstrate that this is not a case of occasional lapses; it is a consistent pattern. Moreover, we have limited ourselves to quotations which clearly illustrate the problem in a brief phrase or two; analysis of entire articles would be even more persuasive. (Because references to UFOs, astrology, witches, and other unrelated topics are sprinkled throughout many of the articles attacking parapsychology, they also appear in a few of our excerpts.)

It is not relevant here whether one "believes in" psi phenomena nor whether they are in fact genuine. Our concern is with the intellectual quality of the published debate. Extraordinary claims demand not merely skepticism (which is just as cheap as credulity), but rigorous, imaginative, dispassionate investigation (which is harder to come by).

THE PROBLEM

For some time now, especially since the founding of the CSICP in 1976, *The Humanist* has provided a forum for those who would rationally evaluate the bewildering barrage of claims associated with the term "paranormal." Such a forum is much needed: the universities are generally uninformed on the subject; the press typically contributes to the problem; the public is confused; and, except for those directly involved in the research, the scientific community will not face up to the issue.

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Unfortunately, indications of a problem have been evident since the Committee was formed. In announcing its formation, statements of high purpose were undercut by talk of the "need to organize some strategy of refutation" (5, p. 28)² and to explore motivations of those who believe strange things. For example: "The scientific debunker's job may be compared to that of the trash collector. The fact that the garbage truck comes by today does not mean there won't be another load tomorrow" (6, p. 8). A debunker is indeed like a trash collector, but a scientific investigator is not.

The Humanist has run special issues on: "The New Cults" (1), "Antiscience and Pseudoscience" (6), and "The Psychics Debunked" (9). These, plus a number of articles in other issues, constitute an editorial stance, attacking with little distinction a perceived class of persons ranging from satanists through astrologers to psychical researchers. These articles have relied heavily on *ad hominem* attacks and a general strategy of assigning guilt by association. In those few instances where the claims have been distinguished from the claimants and addressed on their merits, we find unsubstantiated allegations, internal contradictions, logical *non sequiturs*, and use of rumor and innuendo. At the extreme, rational criticism has given way to the invocation of Higher Authority and prophecy of apocalyptic consequences if these heresies are not suppressed. The "debunkers" have thus become the very thing they claim to despise: evangelical "true believers," standing on unexamined faith rather than objective analysis.

AD HOMINEM

Arguments that appeal to prejudice rather than to intellect are difficult to categorize. To help the reader grasp their variety and prevalence in *The Humanist*'s attacks, we have grouped a selection of examples as best we could.

False Categorization

When the CSICP was formed, Co-Chairman Marcello Truzzi³ noted that such claims come from widely different sources which

² Numbers in parentheses refer to a list of relevant issues of *The Humanist* at the end of this article. We have not cited authors here, since our concern is not with any individual writer, but with the editorial stance created by the totality of statements such as those cited.

³ On August 9, 1977, Dr. Truzzi resigned as Committee Co-Chairman and as Editor of its magazine, *The Zetetic*, in disagreement over the Committee's methods of operation.

CPYRGHT

cannot reasonably be lumped together and responded to as if they were the same. But this is just what has been done. For example, a lead article in *The Humanist* lumps together for common criticism such disparate entities as Aikido, Transcendental Meditation, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Mary Baker Eddy, encounter groups, yoga, organic gardening, Kirlian photography, and ESP (6, pp. 27-31).

Another article lumps together various types of "non-scientific" entities with the phrase: "... they hold beliefs in God, devils, ouija boards, ESP, precognition, and so on" (6, p. 32).

In a similar collective vein, the cover of *The Humanist's* May/June, 1977, issue proclaims: "The Psychics Debunked!" The cover picture is of a wild-eyed gypsy crystal-gazer, and the headlined articles include "The Unsinkable Jeane Dixon" and "Rogue Medium Tells All." But the bulk of the text is aimed at two targets: the leading science writer of *Newsweek*, and two senior physicists at a major research institution.

The critics of parapsychology will travel a long way to find a dead horse to beat into an associate supporting their argument:

Who was Lysenko? How did his actions stop research in Russian genetics for a generation? Why do I think of him when I read the silly stuff out of SRI [Stanford Research Institute]? (9, p. 15).

This scenario [interest in psi phenomena leading to distrust of science] is actually quite similar to what happened in Russia during the Lysenko era (5, p. 31—a different writer from the preceding citation).

Personal Defamation

Sometimes the attack is upon imagined or irrelevant personal characteristics of the individual investigator:

Targ's father at one time owned a bookstore that sold nut books on everything from phrenology to hypnotism and astrology. So Targ is fundamentally a believer in these things (6, p. 16).

Incidentally, Targ's father, William Targ, is an editor at Putnam's which has published plenty of profitable psychic books (6, p. 15—a different writer from the preceding citation).

Dr. Puthoff is a Scientologist. I hardly need mention to you the abandonment of reasoning powers that would indicate, . . . I have more good common sense than any six of those fellows (6, pp. 16-17).

One experiment was dismissed with a brief crack at the experimenter's "never having absorbed from his [Ph.D.] studies at MIT that the laws of probability need a little more elbow room" (9, p. 15).

CPYRGHT

Group Derogation

Sometimes the critic bases his case on the mere statement that an investigator belongs to a group the critic distrusts. For example, it is revealed that a group of researchers "are physicists to a man. Not, I hasten to add, that one has anything against physicists. It's just that they have an unfortunate tradition of being the biggest kinds of suckers when it comes to fraudulent psychic phenomena" (9, p. 22). How can we apply such statements to the research in question—are we to conclude that no physicist is competent to scientifically investigate paranormal phenomena? There are other similar character evaluations:

The recognized top academic ESP experts (ESPerits for short) are a most peculiar breed of "scientist" (6, p. 14).

. . . the failures [of parapsychology] are the result of scientific research being carried out by closet occultists with PhDs. Cult Phuds, to give them a more convenient name, permit metaphysics to interfere with physics (9, p. 12). [This is from an article entitled: "When you Give a Closet Occultist a PhD, What Kind of Research Can you Expect?"]

. . . the entire field of parapsychology has, from its very beginnings, been crowded with characters as trustworthy as the Emperor's tailors (6, p. 14).

God-believers . . . have in effect rejected the use of logic and experience, the use of objective criteria for which they have substituted subjective, irrational, and emotional methods of thinking. . . . Thus, many religious believers are more likely to accept other strange views (6, p. 32).

We will concede there are good arguments against the conclusion that the universe is ruled by a purposeful Creator. But, since the dawn of rationality, great thinkers have come down on both sides of this question and it does not yet seem headed for resolution. Moreover, there is no evidence that scientists who have rejected belief in a deity have proved more competent, rational, or reliable than their believing colleagues. And, even if this could be shown to be true in general, it would not entitle us to prejudge any individual case. Scientific findings must be judged on their merits.

IN LOCO RATIONIS

Even when *The Humanist* manages to see past the personality of the experimenter to consider the work itself, its criticism relies heavily on vague, sweeping charges and general imputations of base motivations. Some examples follow:

CPYRGHT

Unsubstantiated Allegations

... many of the positive parapsychology results being published are fraudulent, the result of data-tampering or improperly controlled experiments (5, p. 31).

It goes without saying that the prime motive for all this is money; . . . the broad academic realities are obvious: reporting negative ESP results will not generate new foundation grants or maintain old financial sources. . . . Is it coincidence that we are in an economic depression that has hit physicists especially hard? . . . During the current severe shortage of funding, plenty of academic chicanery is bound to keep surfacing, despite the best cover-up efforts (6, p. 15).

They prefer not to use the occult term because they try to get money from the government to conduct their experiments. And I hate to tell you, but some dummies in the government actually approved the funding (6, p. 20).

In fortunetelling land, the verbal shoe always fits. The reports from SRI's remote viewing tests, the Maimonides' dream lab . . . suffer from shoe-fitting language, and all their results are worthless (9, p. 13).

Contradictions

Contradictory arguments against psi phenomena, appearing within and between writers, have been a feature of the criticisms of parapsychology since the 1930s and should suggest to the open-minded skeptic that the true issues are not being faced. Here are some of *The Humanist's* contributions to the historian's collection:

Targ and Puthoff are said to lack "any kind of sustained experience in the tricky field of parapsychology" (9, p. 22); yet six pages earlier another writer says that "neither author is a novice in psychical research. Targ's interest in psychic phenomena goes back some twenty years." Both statements are offered with derogatory intent.

We are told that "if ESP were proved to be a reality it would not provide a serious threat to science or other accepted views" (9, p. 18). Yet six pages later we read that if even half of what is claimed proved to be true, "modern theories of physics, to say nothing of physiology and psychology, would need to be overhauled pretty ruthlessly."

Several writers claim that books which debunk popular beliefs do not sell well: "You may be sure that the sale of these books [has] been only a tiny fraction of the sales of books promoting the original vagaries" (6, p. 8). Yet another critic writes: "But my book has brought me a popularity that I had never expected . . . [the publisher] was perceptive enough to realize that not only did they have a

CPYRGHT

potentially good-selling book on their hands, but also that they had an important subject" (6, p. 21).

One critic complains that he received no response to some of his letters. Then he says: "Not responding to a letter is, in my view, irresponsible. A scientist has the time to respond in a simple manner to a simple direct letter." The same critic, several pages later, remarks with regard to his own correspondence: "—well, I have a big rubber stamp at home that says, 'See your doctor,' and I usually stamp that across the top of the letter and send it back. I haven't the time to fuss around with answers to this kind of thing" (6, pp. 20 and 22).

One critic refers to "almost universal scientific hostility [to parapsychology]" (9, p. 22). Yet, the same writer stated in the *New Scientist* (January 25, 1973, p. 209) that its poll showed that "parapsychology is clearly counted as being exceedingly interesting and relevant by a very large number of today's working scientists . . . a massive 88% held the investigation of ESP to be 'a legitimate undertaking' . . . a paltry 3% [considered] ESP an impossibility."

Non Sequiturs

Many *Humanist* writers in their attacks on parapsychology use statements that in tone and context vaguely imply disapproval. One critic writes:

. . . those bearded eminences, Crookes, Lodge, Wallace, Richet, who solemnly called up ghosts of the dead. . . . And what, one asks, has become of these great men and the amazing phenomena they once proclaimed so loudly to the world? (9, p. 24).

The question is never answered, but the reader must apparently assume that these scientists were all proved to have been duped. The writer then springs to the conclusion that because Uri Geller has attracted the attention of some noted scientists, they too will ultimately find they have been duped. This sort of *non sequitur* via an unstated conclusion is common in these articles, but does not lend itself to illustration by short quotations.

More explicit *non sequiturs* also abound. For example, it is charged that those who have worked long in the field are suspect because they "have an absolute commitment to a belief in the paranormal" (9, p. 22). The supposition that a scientist who believes in his work is not to be trusted would be ridiculed in any other field of research.

Further examples:

The purpose of this article, then, is to try to provide that "final disproof" of astrology. The plan is simple: I shall demonstrate that

astrology arose as magic and that physical arguments and explanations for astrology were only attempts to associate the ancient "art" with each important new science that came along (2, p. 10). [This description applies equally to the history of medicine.]

Of great interest to me [is] the number of psychotherapists, whose discipline taught us what dreams are, who proclaim telepathy or precognition when faced with a patient's dream of this sort. Here is a neat case of cognitive dissonance, interpreting the facts to suit one's world view—in this case occult (9, p. 13).

Rumor and Innuendo

There are many kinds of allegations which are inadmissible in rational discourse, either because their truth is too uncertain or their relevance too tenuous. For example, a critic speculates (without evidence) that a friend of Uri Geller's named Shipi might have slipped in a changed specimen in an experiment. To the experimenter who rejects this possibility, the critic responds: "But according to Shipi's sister, Shipi is quite capable of such things . . ." (9, p. 29).

Here are some other examples *The Humanist* was willing to print:

People at SRI would only whisper about how sloppily the Targ and Puthoff experiments were done and criticize them verbally; but when you tried to get them to put their criticisms into print, that was a different matter altogether (6, p. 20).

It is probable that the great Victorian chemist Sir William Crookes collaborated with the medium Florence Cook's fake seances, as a diversion to conceal their romantic entanglement (6, p. 14). [An unsubstantiated rumor used to support the charge that "the entire field of parapsychology" is crowded with untrustworthy characters.]

That Uri [Geller] sometimes uses gimmicks is *beyond doubt* [our emphasis]. Bob McAllister, a New York magician, spotted a palmed magnet in Uri's hand on one occasion. . . . As I have said elsewhere, rats and electrons don't cheat. Superpsychics do (9, pp. 31-32).

These writers would, of course, be quick to ridicule this sort of gossip if it were offered as evidence that a "paranormal" event had occurred.

IN EXTREMIS

Appeals to Authority

When logic fails, the critic is tempted to appeal to authority: he says in exasperation: "I have failed to convince you, but you must

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

believe me anyway, because the authorities are on my side." *The Humanist's* proclamations on astrology—banning it (2)—and on evolution—enforcing it (8)—are in this vein. As Carl Sagan noted, such authoritarian statements are not convincing because they do not confront the issue substantively, but rely on discussion of origins, motivations, and lack of mechanism. They come dangerously close to defining dissent as heresy. Sagan writes:

I find myself unable to endorse the "Objections to Astrology" statement [in *The Humanist*, Sept./Oct., 1975]—not because I feel that astrology has any validity whatever, but because I felt and still feel that the tone of the statement is authoritarian. The fundamental point is not that the origins of astrology are shrouded in superstition. This is true as well for chemistry, medicine, and astronomy, to mention only three. To discuss the psychological motivations of those who believe in astrology seems to me quite peripheral to the issue of its validity. That we can think of no mechanism for astrology is relevant but unconvincing. No mechanism was known, for example, for continental drift when it was proposed by Wegener. Nevertheless, we see that Wegener was right, and those who objected on the grounds of unavailable mechanism were wrong. . . .

Statements contradicting borderline, folk, or pseudoscience that appear to have an authoritarian tone can do more damage than good. They never convince those who are flirting with pseudoscience but merely seem to confirm their impression that scientists are rigid and closed-minded. In my view there is no way to approach such subjects except substantively (Letter to Editor, 4, p. 2).

The Critic as True Believer

It is ironic that the authoritarian approach has led many of *The Humanist's* writers into the posture of the self-same "true believers" they are criticizing. They are sustained by faith and argue by emotion. They want to save others from erroneous beliefs. For example:

So let us do our best to get rid of this ideological garbage, lest it inundate the earth. . . . If we save even a few from the lure of the higher nonsense, our efforts will have been worthwhile (6, p. 8).

I'm trying, in my way, to bring society to a rationalist point of view . . . and I am waging a battle here, and I have lots of troops on my side. But we are waging a battle that can never be won. . . . But I am going to continue to try, and see what results I can get. . . . That, to me, is very rewarding. If it happens for one person only, it was worth doing the book (6, pp. 16-22).

. . . then I will refund approximately *eight times the amount of the royalty paid to me for each book sold*. In making this offer, without any urging by my publisher, I risk personal bankruptcy—the loss of

everything I have managed to save in a lifetime. This does not prove that my appraisal is correct, but it does provide a meaningful measure of the extent of my confidence (6, p. 13).

The critic as true believer finds himself committed to reconfirming his beliefs, regardless of the evidence. His investigation has but one purpose: to find the "nonparanormal" explanation. If he cannot find one, he creates his own:

Since no magicians were present . . . it is impossible to do more than speculate on possible nonparanormal explanations. One scenario is . . . [and many more follow] (9, p. 27).

He has a simple faith that all valid things will fit into his (often outdated) understanding of the current scientific worldview:

A belief is invalid if it contradicts other well-grounded beliefs within a framework (6, p. 30). [On the basis of this criterion, offered by the editor of *The Humanist*, relativity and quantum mechanics could hardly have found a foothold.]

The editorial stance of *The Humanist* finally comes to the point where all nonsense is called "nonsense for short" (6, p. 32) and, following the well-known psychological principle of ascribing one's own motivations and outlook to one's adversaries, such things as the following are written:

We are confronted today with a form of moral righteousness and anti-intellectualism—often bordering on hysteria (6, p. 28).

For a moment one of the writers holds the truth in his hand: "Two can play the game of faith; for example, I can assert that I have blind faith that there are no real witches, God, ESP and so on" (6, p. 32). But further down the page, he retreats, saying that those with faith in ideas other than his "have in effect rejected the use of logic and experience. . . ." Another writer notes: ". . . there is reasonable faith and unreasonable faith . . ." (3, p. 35). Presumably his and theirs, respectively.⁴

The True Believer has continually to steel himself against evil forces tempting him with evidence which challenges his belief. Such a posture was essential when man's reason was his only tool. But science has now given us techniques for examining evidence which enable us to discover truths transcending common sense (e.g., rela-

⁴ In this regard, we suggest that readers explore the writings of sociologist Harry Collins of the University of Bath, England, and historians Seymour Mauskopf of Duke University and Michael McVaugh of the University of North Carolina. They have written some insightful papers on the debates between mainline and frontier scientists, which enable us to observe ourselves as actors in this drama.

tivity and quantum mechanics). Thus, it is particularly revealing when *The Humanist*, in the guise of scientific investigation, cites a pre-scientific philosopher as a model for what to do when faced with a demonstration of evidence that challenges preconceived belief. This critic quotes an essay on Democritus:

... a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, and who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility (9, p. 32).

Apocalyptic Rhetoric

When the charge of heresy no longer suffices, the final stand of the true believer is to prophesy the apocalypse: like Socrates, the heretic is said to be part of a larger movement to subvert the minds of the young and destroy civilization:

... like the Hellenic civilization, it [scientific enlightenment] may be overwhelmed by irrationalism, subjectivism and obscurantism (5, p. 28).

The doomsday curse is laid without distinction on recognized scientists, sideshow hucksters, and all others deemed part of the "cults of unreason."

Indeed, there is always the danger that science itself may be engulfed by those forces of unreason. . . . I am afraid we will be constantly confronted by new forms of "know-nothingism" . . . (6, p. 31).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The rationalist need not be infallible in fact or judgment; but he must be open-minded and argue rationally. We agree with Marvin Zimmerman when he says that "humanists and others committed to scientific method are less excusable for locking their minds than others are" (6, p. 33).

The Humanist is at its best when questioning the substance of evidence behind claims of the paranormal. The continuing exchange with Gauquelin concerning his asserted correlation between prominence in sports and certain planetary configurations is a model case. Tedious, but the only proper way to resolve scientific claims. Similarly, Gardner appears to have done considerable homework for his review (9, pp. 25-32) of Panati's *The Geller Papers*; if he had

limited himself to the substantive points, he would have had a valid and hard-hitting critique. Hyman's article (9, pp. 16-20) on SRI work also addresses some substantive questions. Eriksen's brief paper (7, pp. 43-44) on astrological inaccuracies is factual and to the point. But unfortunately these are the exceptions.

We are not alone in these concerns. Increasingly, the letters to the Editor of *The Humanist* are expressing similar distress. Nor are we discussing fine points; we are concerned with preserving the very integrity of the rationalist position. The effectiveness of *The Humanist* as a voice for rationality is a direct function of its faithfulness to its own principles. The defense of Reason is like the defense of Virtue. Its disciples must practice what they preach, or they do their cause more harm than good.

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REFERENCES

(Issues of *The Humanist* referred to in the text)

- (1) Sept./Oct., 1974; (2) Sept./Oct., 1975; (3) Nov./Dec., 1975; (4) Jan./Feb., 1976; (5) May/June, 1976; (6) July/Aug., 1976; (7) Nov./Dec., 1976; (8) Jan./Feb., 1977; (9) May/June, 1977.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

EXTENSION

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SG11

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. SG11

COC

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① I got this in the mail 12/21/77
 in an envelope marked from "OSI"
 Who in OSI sent this &
 why? with my name on it
 it should have been classified
 (which it hasn't done).

③ Negative info. on this.

④

5→9: Interesting
 PACKAGE in view of
 our Telecom yesterday
 about The Humanist.
 This is additional
 stuff on same
 general subject.

5→11: I have been
 unable to identify
 who in OSI sent it.
 I suspect it was
 not from OSI, since
 LSD personnel (still in
 OSI as far as I
 know) would have
 received it first. Perhaps